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Patent law as a field of academic study has benefited enor-
mously from the attention of economists. Indeed, law professors are
relative newcomers to the academic patent field, trickling in behind
the economists in small but growing numbers as patent law evolves
from an arcane, practitioner-taught specialty to a less marginal role
in law school curriculums.' Yet considering the prominence of
economists in academic discourse about the patent system, they
have had relatively little impact on patent law and policy. One rea-
son for this disparity between the role of economists in the academy
and in policy arenas may be the indeterminacy of economic analysis
* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. © Re-
becca S. Eisenberg 2000. I am grateful to Ronald Mann and workshop participants at Vanderbilt
Law School for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. The number of full-time law school faculty members who teach and write in the patent
field has increased significantly in the past twenty years. Notable examples of legal scholars
writing in the field prior to that time include Martin Adelman, Donald Chisum, James Gambrell,
Edmund Kitch, and John Stedman.
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in evaluating the patent system. 2 Another reason may be a failure
on the part of some economists to focus their analysis on the kinds
of decisions that courts and policy-makers confront in the course of
administering and fine-tuning the patent system.
This is a missed opportunity of more than academic signifi-
cance. The pros and cons of the patent system are getting more at-
tention right now than they have in many years. By some meas-
ures, the patent system appears to be in ascendancy, expanding
into previously hostile regions of the world,3 previously patent-free
fields of endeavor, 4 and previously nonproprietary research set-
tings.5 Yet the patent system is provoking controversy along the
way, as skeptics question whether these patents are on balance
promoting technological progress or retarding it.6 Interest in pat-
2. See generally WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS:
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS & WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT), (National
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (concluding on basis of survey results
that "patents are used in substantially different ways across different technologies, suggesting
that policy and court decisions affecting the breadth of claims, applicable nonobviousness stan-
dards, likelihood of being upheld in court and other features of patents will likely have different
impacts on invention and competition in different industries"); ADAM B. JAFFE, THE U.S. PATENT
SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: POLICY INNOVATION AND THE INNOVATION PROCESS (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7280, 1999) (reviewing economics literature on recent trends
in patent law and concluding that "robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for
technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few").
3. See generally Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent
Provision in the TRIPS Agreement. The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (1996)
(providing an appraisal of India's patent law).
4. See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property Rights in Methods of Doing Business, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (1999) (considering the extent to which business
methods should be protected by intellectual property laws); SAMUEL KORTUM & JOSH LERNER,
STRONGER PROTECTION OR TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: WHAT IS BEHIND THE RECENT SURGE
IN PATENTING? (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6204, 1997) (examining
possible causes of recent surge in U.S. patenting); JOSH LERNER, WHERE DOES STATE STREET
LEAD? A FIRST LOOK AT FINANCE PATENTS, 1971-2000 (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. W7918, 2000) (documenting increase in patenting of financial formulas and
methods).
5. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development. Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (re-
viewing history of federal policy concerning intellectual property rights in the results of govern-
ment-sponsored research); REBECCA HENDERSON ET AL., UNIVERSITIES AS A SOURCE OF
COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY: A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY PATENTING, 1965-1988 (Na-
tional Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5068, 1995) (discussing the "explosion in
university patenting"); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, PRIVATIZING R&D: PATENT POLICY AND
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NATIONAL LABORATORY TECHNOLOGIES (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 7064, 1999) (examining impact of changes in U.S. law on patenting
at national laboratories funded by U.S. Department of Energy).
6. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 265 (2000); Jon F. Merz et al., Disease Gene
Patenting Is a Bad Innovation, 2 MOLECULAR DIAGNOSIS 299 (1997); Pamela Samuelson, Benson
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ents has become sufficiently widespread to command the attention
of busy world leaders,7 as well as prominent treatment in the
popular press.8 In this environment, policy-makers are particularly
likely to be receptive to scholarly input aimed at ensuring that the
patent system does less harm than good.
Legal scholars and economists might enhance the value and
impact of their work by making more effective use of each other's
knowledge and capabilities. Legal scholars can offer a more nu-
anced understanding of the legal rules that underlie the patent sys-
tem and the doctrinal levers that might be manipulated in further-
ance of public policy goals. Economists bring to bear a set of ana-
lytical and methodological tools that could shed considerable light
on what these doctrinal levers are doing and which of them we
ought to be manipulating. Together, we have a better chance of
asking the right questions and thinking about them in a useful
way.
Towards that end, this Essay provides an overview of issues
of patent doctrine that might be illuminated by good work in law
and economics. It is important not only to identify the levers in the
patent system that are available for manipulation, but also to un-
derstand which policy choices are best addressed through the ma-
nipulation of each of these levers. Economic analysis that is
grounded in a better understanding of patent doctrine can better
inform us about the most effective use of the levers that control the
operation of the patent system.
I. SUBJECT MATTER BOUNDARIES
A much-noted dimension of the apparent expansion of the
patent system in recent years has been the range of patent-eligible
subject matter. Once confined to traditional fields of applied tech-
nology such as mechanics and chemicals, the patent system has
Revisited. The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1029-30 (1990).
7. See e.g., President Bill Clinton & Prime Minister Tony Blair, Joint Statement (March
14, 2000), available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/20-
00I-3/14/7.text.1 ("To realize the full promise of this research, raw fundamental data on the hu-
man genome, including the human DNA sequence and its variations, should be made freely
available to scientists everywhere."); Asako Saegusa, Japan May Place Gene Research on Sum-
mit Agenda, 404 NATURE 324 (2000).
8. See e.g., James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at
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moved into agriculture,9 medical procedures, 10 computer software,"
and business methods. 12 The expansion has occurred largely
through judicial decisions and administrative practice, with
changes in statutory language typically following, rather than
leading, the way.'3 As commentators have questioned whether liv-
ing things, computer algorithms, and business methods are appro-
priate subject matter for patents, the courts in these and other ar-
eas have seen no reason to limit the patent system's realm.
Why does the patent system need subject matter boundaries?
What light can economics shed on the risks of the expansion of pat-
ent-eligible subject matter that seems to be underway? Perhaps
subject matter boundaries preserve the integrity of patent law as a
one-size-fits-all system, ensuring that the kinds of innovations the
law protects are similar enough that a single set of rules is a rea-
sonable approximation of how best to promote progress throughout
its domain. Yet economists have demonstrated empirically that the
role of patents varies greatly from one industry to another.14 A set
of rules that works tolerably well for machines or drugs may not
work as well for information products, business methods, and dis-
9. See generally Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985) (considering a matter
"relat[ing] to maize plant technologies").
10. See generally Allergan Sales, Inc. v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1283 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (reviewing a claim of infringement for a patent that "include[d] a method of
implantation of an artificial intraocular lens having a deformable optic zone portion with pre-
scribed memory characteristics").
11. See generally AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[l]t is now clear that computer-based programming constitutes patentable subject matter so
long as the basic requirements of [35 U.S.C.] § 101 are met."); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (concluding that a programmed computer could be entitled to patent protection).
12. See generally State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (extending patent protection to a business method).
13. The patent statute has defined patent-eligible subject matter in the same terms (proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) for many years. Nonetheless, when the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office C(PTO") and the courts have permitted patenting of inventions
in areas that previous case law had seemed to exclude from patent protection, Congress has
sometimes responded by adding statutory provisions that are addressed specifically to these new
fields, arguably endorsing the judicial expansion. For example, controversy over the patenting of
medical and surgical methods led Congress to enact new legislation specifying that the remedies
for patent infringement shall not apply to medical practitioners and related health entities for
performance of a medical activity. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009-16 (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994 & Supp. IV)). More recently, Congress responded to controversy over
the patenting of business methods by enacting new legislation that provides a defense to in-
fringement of business method patents for prior users of those methods. See Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1994)).
14. See Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D, in 3
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1987);
Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 173
(1986); COHEN ET AL., supra note 2
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coveries about the natural world. In the give-and-take of public
policy, Congress has sometimes mediated conflicts between indus-
tries that disagree about proposed changes in patent law by carving
out special rules for particular fields. 15 Conflict across fields is
likely to increase as the subject matter of the patent system ex-
pands.
The trend of authority in the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit is to exclude from the ambit of the patent system only
useless abstractions. 16 Perhaps economic analysis can improve upon
this approach. Economics might shed light on whether there are
categories of useful discoveries that are best left outside the patent
system, or clarify what differences or similarities among fields de-
termine whether they can live together under a single legal regime.
More generally, economists might illuminate the tradeoffs between
the costs and benefits of applying a single set of rules across all
fields of technology.
II. UTILITY
Another doctrinal lever that has received more attention in
policy arenas than in academic discourse is the utility requirement.
To be patentable, an invention must be useful. This requirement,
which arguably follows from the constitutional limitation of patent
protection to the "useful arts,"17 appears twice in the Patent Act. 18
Although the utility requirement has played little role in
evaluating the patentability of mechanical inventions,' 9 it has been
more prominent in the chemical and biotechnology fields, in which
new compounds are often discovered before their functions are well
15. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(b)(1994)) (providing that a biotechnological process using or resulting in a composition of
matter that is novel and nonobvious shall be considered nonobvious); see also supra note 13
(noting how Congress has responded to certain controversies over patenting).
16. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357-58.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Section 101 of the Patent Act, in defining patent-eligible
subject matter, states that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter... may obtain a patent therefor." Id. (emphasis added).
Section 112, which sets forth the disclosure requirements for a patent application, calls for a
description that is sufficient to enable others "to make and use" the invention. Id. § 112 (empha-
sis added).
19. For mechanical inventions, the utility requirement serves primarily as a convenient
ground for rejecting claims to implausible inventions such as perpetual motion machines. See,
e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989). It has also occasionally been
invoked as a basis for excluding from patent protection inventions that are deemed immoral or
fraudulent. See, e.g., Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 870-73 (2d Cir. 1900).
208520001
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understood.20 In the early 1990s, to the consternation of the patent-
sensitive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the Patent
& Trademark Office ("PTO") began rejecting for lack of utility pat-
ent claims to inventions of potential therapeutic value if the patent
applicant could offer no proof of clinical efficacy.21 This strict inter-
pretation of the utility requirement ultimately provoked sharp re-
buke from the Federal Circuit 2 and led to the implementation of
new utility guidelines aimed at restricting utility rejections. 23
More recently, the PTO has sought to reinvigorate the utility
requirement as a ground for rejecting claims to novel DNA se-
quences for which the applicant has not disclosed a biological func-
tion. The PTO has issued new interim guidelines on the utility re-
quirement 24 and new training materials for examiners on how to
apply the requirement to biotechnology inventions. 25 These guide-
lines and training materials have been met with sharply divergent
reactions among commentators 26 and have been addressed in con-
gressional oversight hearings.27 Plainly, the consequences of
choosing a strict or loose interpretation of the utility requirement
are sufficient to motivate high-level attention to the issue among
policymakers. Yet it remains unclear why the patent system has a
utility requirement and how we should think about what is at stake
in choosing between strict or lax enforcement.
The courts treat the utility requirement as a hybrid subject
matter limitation and disclosure requirement.28 As a subject matter
limitati6n, it restricts the patent system to the "useful arts"-in
other words, applied technology-as distinguished from abstract
20. See e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-36 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Exparte Aggarwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1335-39 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.
1992); Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1703-05 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992);
Exparte Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1894 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1991).
22. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
23. See PTO, Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the Utility
Requirement, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263, 36264 (1995).
24. See PTO, Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71440, 71441
(1999), corrected 65 Fed. Reg. 3425 (2000).
25. See PTO, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pats.html.
26. See PTO, Public Comments on the United States Patent and Trademark Office, "Revised
Interim Utility Examination Guidelines," available at http://www.uspto.gov/weboffices/com/s-
ol/comments/utilguide/index.html.
27. See Oversight Hearing on Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000).
28. This treatment follows the two statutory references to utility in provisions addressing
subject matter and disclosure. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (1994).
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knowledge. 29 As a disclosure limitation, it calls upon patent appli-
cants to teach the public how to use their inventions as well as how
to make them.
Another possible way of understanding the utility require-
ment is as a timing device, helping to identify when an invention is
ripe for patent protection. This understanding finds support in lan-
guage from the last Supreme Court case to address the utility re-
quirement, Brenner v. Manson.30 In that case the Court affirmed a
rejection of a patent claim for a method of synthesizing a novel
steroid on the ground that the patent applicant had failed to dis-
close a practical utility for the steroid. Conceding that further re-
search might reveal such a utility, the Court observed that "a pat-
ent is not a hunting license ... it is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion."'31 More recent decisions
of the Federal Circuit suggest a willingness to issue patents at an
earlier stage in the research process. For example, in In re Brana
the Federal Circuit reversed a rejection of claims to novel com-
pounds that were structurally similar to other compounds display-
ing antitumor activity in mice.3 2 While recognizing that further re-
search would be necessary before the compounds could be adminis-
tered to humans, the court held that "[u]sefulness in patent law,
and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, nec-
essarily includes the expectation of further research and develop-
ment."33 The Federal Circuit did not cite the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Brenner v. Manson, and it is not obvious how the two cases
can be reconciled.
Economic analysis could illuminate what is at stake in this
debate by clarifying the implications of granting or withholding
patent protection in early stages of research. Some years ago, Ed-
mund Kitch offered an intriguing account of the function of patents
that contrasted sharply with the Supreme Court's vision in Brenner
v. Manson.34 Kitch argued that granting broad patent rights in the
early stages of innovation promotes efficiency in the further devel-
opment of promising technological prospects, much like the award
of exclusive mineral claims promotes efficiency in the exploration of
29. See generally In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (1965) (asserting "that a patent system
must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy").
30. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
31. Id. at 536.
32. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (1995).
33. Id. at 1565-69.
34. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
208720001
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
natural resources. Economists were skeptical of his arguments at
the time he published them.35 Meanwhile, the PTO has alternated
between very strict and very lax enforcement of the utility stan-
dard, with no clear policy basis for choosing one approach over an-
other. The choice makes a big difference to universities and some
private firms that specialize in "upstream" research that is removed
from end product development. Perhaps it is time for economists to
revisit the question of when discoveries are ripe for patent protec-
tion.
III. NOVELTY
Perhaps the most basic limitation on access to the patent
system is that one may only patent something that is new. This is
so easily justified in intuitive economic terms that it might seem
hardly to merit the attention of anyone with sophisticated training
in economics. Granting patents on technologies that are not new
would impose the social costs of monopolies without the counter-
vailing benefits of promoting development and introduction of wel-
fare-enhancing inventions. Why, then, is the novelty standard a
worthy topic for economic analysis?
What is "new" or "novel" for patent purposes is a function of
how patent law defines the content of the "prior art." The categories
of references that count as prior art are set forth in section 102 of
the Patent Act, a Byzantine set of rules at the core of the patent
system that economists have largely neglected. The most important
sources of prior art are those that are readily accessible to patent
examiners, primarily prior patents and printed publications. 36
Other statutory categories of prior art, including technologies that
were previously invented, 37 known, or used by others,38 are less
likely to come to the attention of the PTO at the time of examina-
tion, but may be invoked in challenging the validity of an issued
35. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIc EFFEcTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 9-
10 (1977).
36. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(b) (1994).
37. Under § 102(g) of the Patent Act, an invention fails the test of novelty if "before the ap-
plicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed it." Id. § 102(g).
38. Section 102(a) provides that an invention fails the test of novelty if "the invention was
known or used by others in this country ... before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent." Id. § 102(a). Section 102(b) bars issuance of a valid patent if "the invention was ... in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States ." Id. § 102(b).
2088 [Vol. 53:6:2081
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patent years later in an infringement action.3 9 In order to defeat a
patent for lack of novelty, it is necessary to find every element of
the claimed invention present in a single reference. 40 If it is neces-
sary to combine the disclosures of multiple references to find all of
the elements of the invention, the basis for challenging the patent
is not lack of novelty but rather "obviousness,"41 and further limita-
tions apply.42
These basic rules are now quite old, but one might never-
theless ask whether this approach makes sense. One set of ques-
tions worth exploring is how a proliferation of information in digital
form might alter the inquiry into what is new. For example, is the
"all elements rule" outmoded in the modern information environ-
ment, with search engines to facilitate the rapid consolidation of
information from multiple sources? 43 Another promising line of in-
quiry would focus on the allocation of responsibility and opportu-
nity for identifying patent-defeating prior art between the PTO and
the public. Currently, before a patent is issued we rely on PTO ex-
aminers to identify relevant prior art, aided only by the disclosures
of patent applicants, in the course of confidential ex parte patent
examinations. 44 Once a patent has been issued, any person may cite
prior art references to the PTO that may have a bearing on patent-
ability and ask that the claims be reexamined. 45 A defendant in an
infringement action may also challenge the patentability of the in-
39. An issued patent enjoys a presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). This presumption, however, may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
40. See e.g., In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
41. Section 103(a) of the Patent Act provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
42. The technological scope of the prior art for purposes of an obviousness challenge is lim-
ited to the field of the invention and analogous fields. See Litton Sys. Inc. v. Honeywell, 87 F.3d
1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Moreover, if it is necessary to combine references to make the
invention obvious, the challenger must show that the prior art suggests combining the teachings
of the different references. See In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
43. A related question is whether the limitations on the pertinent art for purposes of an ob-
viousness challenge still make sense as information technology makes it easier to search for
references in unrelated fields.
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1994) (providing that "[tihe Director shall cause an examination to
be made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears
that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent there-
for").
45. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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vention by asserting invalidity as a defense. 46 The perception of
many patent lawyers is that it would be a poor strategic move for a
potential infringement defendant to show its cards to the patent
holder by seeking reexamination of a patent rather than waiting to
litigate the issue in an infringement action.47 As a result, costly liti-
gation is typically necessary to get rid of erroneously issued pat-
ents. Robert Merges has recently argued that we might be better
served by permitting pre-issuance opposition to patents that would
bring the full range of prior art to the attention of the PTO in a
timely fashion.48 This issue might be illuminated by good empirical
research, perhaps comparing the U.S. reexamination system to for-
eign opposition systems.
Recent experience suggests that the rules for determining
prior art are less effective when the patent system enters a new
arena, such as information technology or business methods. Be-
cause advances in these areas have only recently been considered
eligible for patent protection, traditional sources of prior art, espe-
cially prior patents and publications, are less reliable as indicators
of the state of the art. Prior innovators, believing that their
achievements were categorically excluded from the patent system,
had little incentive to file patent applications that would document
their achievements, and might also have refrained from publishing
their work to avoid forfeiting their next best strategy for protection,
trade secrecy. As a result, patent examiners have limited sources of
prior art to consider in examining patent applications in these
fields.
Another aspect of the current prior art rules that legal
scholars are exploring with economic analysis is strategic prior art
creation to defeat the patent claims of rivals. 49 Do current rules
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
47. One reason for this is that the reexamination is generally conducted by the patent ex-
aminer who conducted the original examination, who may be difficult to persuade that his own
prior decision to award the patent was wrong. Another limitation of reexamination is that it
may only be used to call attention to prior patents or printed publications and not to bring for-
ward less conspicuous categories of prior art (such as prior knowledge or use by others) that are
more likely to have escaped the attention of the examiner. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)
(governing citations of prior art); 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994) (regulating requests for reexaminations).
48. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 610-15
(1999).
49. See generally Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926
(2000) (exploring "the strategy of preemptive publication in patent races and evaluat[ing] its
welfare implications").
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make it strategically advantageous to create patent-defeating prior
art? Is anyone responding to these incentives? Is this good or bad?
This promising line of economic analysis would benefit from careful
grounding in legal doctrine and observed practice. 50
Another Byzantine set of rules that plays a more conspicuous
role in patent practice than it does in scholarly debates is the U.S.
"first-to-invent" system for resolving priority disputes. 51 This
unique feature of the U.S. patent system contrasts with the "first-
to-file" rule for awarding patent priority in every other major pat-
ent system in the world.5 2 It has been a prominent focus of trade
negotiations in the past and may reappear on the patent policy
scene, although it has been quiescent in recent years. Patent practi-
tioners who have urged that the first-to-invent rule be retained
have generally advanced arguments about fairness. 53 Economists
might play a useful role in evaluating the system from the perspec-
tive of efficiency. This might also be a fruitful direction for empiri-
cal research, comparing U.S. and foreign patent systems.
IV. NONOBVIOUSNESS
In order to be patentable, an invention must be nonobvious
to a person of ordinary skill in light of the prior art. Originally a
judicial creation, 54 this requirement is now codified at section 103 of
the Patent Act.55 The meaning of this standard has been much con-
tested in the patent system over time.56 The courts have elaborated
50. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Prior Art Creation
Through Publication: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2000).
51. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 104 (1994).
52. In fact, the U.S. patent system looks to both the application filing date and the inven-
tion date in determining the content of the prior art. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(e), 102(g)
(1994) (calling for determination of prior art as of invention date) with 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 102(d)
(1994) (calling for determination of prior art as of one year prior to application filing date). See
generally MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 203-07 (1998) (de-
scribing relationship between the "novelty" and "statutory bar" subsections of § 102).
53. See, e.g., Coe A. Bloomberg, In Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255,
260-63 (1993); George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate-First-to-Invent vs. First-to-File,
1967 DuKE L.J. 923 (1967); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File" Is American Adoption of the In-
ternational Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 576-80
(1990).
54. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 266 (1850).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994), amended by 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. IV 1998); see supra note 41.
56. See generally P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 APLA. Q.J. 87 (1977); Edmund
Kitch, Graham v. John Deere: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. or. REV. 293 (1966) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's treatment of § 103 and potential improvements made by the Coures
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upon it in formulaic rules that shed little light on the underlying
policy considerations at stake.57
What is the function of the nonobviousness requirement in
patent law? How well formulated is the requirement to perform this
function?58 In a formulation that has resonated with the courts, the
nonobviousness standard distinguishes the unpatentable work of
the "ordinary mechanic" from the patentable advances of more in-
sightful inventors. One way of understanding this distinction is
that patents are unnecessary to bring about mundane improve-
ments that are within easy reach of those working in the field, but
may be needed to motivate inventors to pursue the nonobvious ad-
vances that require something beyond routine work. This suggests
that the nature of the inventive effort leading up to the invention
may have a bearing on its patentability. But the drafters of the
1952 Patent Act, who were unhappy with prior judicial efforts to
distinguish between patentable and unpatentable results in terms
of the nature of the inventive work,59 added to their definition of
nonobviousness the following sentence: "Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."60 This
language arguably excludes the obviousness of the inquiry that led
to a discovery from consideration in assessing the obviousness of
the resulting discovery. One context in which this approach seems
to call for issuance of patents on routine, mechanical work is the
result of high-throughput DNA sequencing.
If the function of the nonobviousness standard is to limit the
issuance of patents to circumstances in which patent incentives are
necessary, it is questionable whether it makes sense to exclude
from consideration the obviousness of the method by which a dis-
covery is made. Economic analysis might help clarify whether the
patent system should reward "sweat of the brow" research efforts,
or whether it should limit patent protection to advances that re-
quire greater insight. A related issue is whether the costs of making
holding in Deere); Giles Rich, Why and How § 103 Came to Be, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE
ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon ed., 1980).
57. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed: Cir. 1995); In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688,
692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
58. Robert Merges offered a critical analysis some years ago that focused on so-called "sec-
ondary considerations," such as commercial success, in evaluating the nonobviousness of an
invention. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV.
803, 816 (1988).
59. Some judicial decisions had interpreted the standard as calling for an extraordinary in-
ventive process that reveals "the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling."
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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a discovery should matter in assessing its patentability. Nothing in
the current legal rules explicitly directs the attention of the PTO
and the courts to R&D costs in determining patentability. Economic
analysis might help evaluate this approach. 61
V. DISCLOSURE
In order to get a patent, an inventor must provide a written
description of the invention, an enabling disclosure of how to make
and use the invention, and disclosure of the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor of making the invention. 62 Applicants may
not make substantive changes to their disclosures after filing their
patent applications without losing the benefit of their original filing
dates (and thereby risking loss of rights if intervening prior art has
a bearing on patentability). 63 This disclosure becomes freely avail-
able to the public upon issuance of the patent, or earlier if there is a
corresponding foreign filing.64
Courts sometimes tout the disclosure as the quid pro quo for
the patent monopoly,65 as if the reason we offer patents is to get
disclosures of technologies that would otherwise be kept secret
rather than simply to promote research and development. But this
claim cries out for closer scrutiny. Apart from informing the public,
patent disclosures also demonstrate to the PTO what the applicant
has done that might justify issuance of a patent.66 Controversies
over whether U.S. patent applications should be disclosed 18
months after their filing dates, like patent applications filed in
most of the world, highlight the importance of rules governing pat-
ent disclosure.
One useful contribution that empirical economists might
make is to gather data on how patent disclosures are actually used.
61. One possibility is that if monopoly rewards are offered for "sweat of the brow" activities
that, although costly, are foreseeable and accessible to anyone of ordinary skill in the field, the
result will be wasteful rent-dissipating patent races. Perhaps patent rewards that are available
only for nonobvious inventions are less likely to have this effect because they are less likely to
occur to multiple rent-seekers at the same time. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 322-38 (1992) (seeking to explain various features
of patent law as reflecting a policy of minimizing rent dissipation).
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
63. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 305 (1994).
64. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122, 153, 154 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
65. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832) (holding that "a correct
specification and description of the thing discovered.., is necessary in order to give the public,
after the [monopoly] privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed").
66. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394-96 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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Who reads patent disclosures, and why? Do they serve primarily as
guides to pending or outstanding patent claims, or are they useful
for the scientific information they contain? How do patent disclo-
sures relate to other disclosures of scientific information, such as
publications? How valuable are the spillovers that patent disclo-
sures create? What impact does patent disclosure have on the value
of patents and on the appropriability of the underlying technology?
Do the current rules make sense?
VI. INFRINGEMENT AND CLAIM SCOPE
A number of economists have analyzed the issue of patent
claim scope.6 7 Additional work would be useful to situate this
analysis within evolving patent doctrine. Determinations of patent
scope turn on multiple, interrelated legal issues that often have
been blurred or overlooked in the economics literature. As a result,
the literature sometimes seems to miss the import of developments
in doctrine and to offer limited guidance for fine-tuning the system
to achieve optimal results.
Patent scope turns on legal rulings made at two separate
stages in the life of a patent: prosecution and infringement litiga-
tion. At the prosecution stage, the PTO decides whether to allow or
reject the applicant's suggested claim language depending on how
the claims compare to the prior art 68 and how the breadth of the
claims compares to the breadth of disclosure.69 These two determi-
nants of allowable claim scope-prior art and disclosure-are in
tension with each other. In a new field, the prior art sets relatively
few constraints on the scope of patent claims, permitting broad pat-
ent protection for pioneering inventions. On the other hand, the
67. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation,
26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 36 (1995); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimum Patent Length and
Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 108-11 (1990), Jerry Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Divi-
sion of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 25-27 (1995); Paul Klemperer, How
Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990); Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-
908 (1990); Ted O'Donoghue, A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation, 29 RAND J.
ECON. 654, 656-58 (1998); Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 860, 868-69 (1990).
68. Claim language that is so broad as to cover technology that has been disclosed in a prior
art reference will be rejected (or subsequently held invalid) for lack of novelty. See Titanium
Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780-83 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69. The disclosure must be sufficient to enable someone of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim without engaging in
undue experimentation. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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primitive state of the art in such a new field may limit the extent to
which the patent disclosure enables other practitioners to make and
use variations on the invention without having to engage in undue
experimentation. As knowledge in the field progresses, it becomes
easier to make an enabling disclosure that will support a broad
claim, but the more extensive prior art available in a mature field
has a countervailing tendency to narrow the scope of allowable
claims.
After a patent has issued, a trial court may revisit the ques-
tion of its scope in infringement litigation. There are several deter-
minations that might have the effect of changing the apparent
scope of a claim at this stage. First, a trial court might decide that a
broad claim is invalid and should not have been allowed under
proper application of the rules discussed in the preceding para-
graph concerning prior art and scope of disclosure. The claims of an
issued patent enjoy a presumption of validity, but a defendant may
overcome this presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
Second, the trial court must construe the claim language in order to
determine whether infringement has occurred, and often the
meaning of the claim is susceptible to multiple interpretations. The
specific interpretive issue before the trial court (for example,
whether the claim covers a variation on the invention that takes
advantage of new technology not yet known at the time of prosecu-
tion) will often be something that no one thought about when the
claim language was drafted, creating ample opportunity for dis-
agreement and uncertainty. Third, even if the claim language does
not cover the defendant's variation, the judge or jury might still
conclude that there is infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. This doctrine, which the Supreme Court recently affirmed,
permits a finding of infringement when the defendant's product or
process, although not within the literal scope of the plaintiffs
claim, is substantially equivalent to the claimed invention. 70
70. See e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24-29 (1997);
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde, 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). Far fewer cases have recognized
a so-called "reverse doctrine of equivalents," excusing a defendant from liability for what would
otherwise be literal infringement of a patent if the defendant's product is so far changed from the
patented invention that it performs the function of the claimed invention in a substantially dif-
ferent way. See e.g., Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898); SRI
Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1122-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Although rarely invoked
and more rarely successful, the reverse doctrine of equivalents features prominently in academic
commentary, perhaps inspired by the intriguing analysis by Professor Merges. See Robert P.
Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example,
73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 878 (1991).
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Contrary to the apparent belief of some economists, the per-
ception of many lawyers is that the Federal Circuit in recent years
has refined the foregoing rules of law in ways that restrict rather
than expand the scope of patents.7 1 This trend towards restrictive
patent scope stands in marked contrast to the expansive trend
within the same court in addressing issues of patentability. 72 Im-
portant elements in the restrictive trend have been robust applica-
tion of the requirements for an enabling disclosure and a written
description of the invention so as to limit the breadth of claims, 7 3 as
well as tighter judicial control over both claim construction7 4 and
application of the doctrine of equivalents. 75 By overlooking these
countertrends to the widely perceived expansion of the patent sys-
tem, much of the economics literature on patent scope misses its
target.
Apart from analyzing the general issue of how broad patent
claims should be, economists who were better versed in patent doc-
trine could usefully illuminate the relative merits of different pro-
cedural mechanisms for making these determinations. What deter-
minations are best made by the PTO at the stage of patent prosecu-
tion, and what circumstances justify revisiting these determina-
tions by trial courts at the stage of infringement litigation? One jus-
tification for the Federal Circuit's restrictive approach to claim con-
struction and the doctrine of equivalents is to increase predictabil-
ity and certainty in infringement determinations. How important
71. Cf. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 36 (reporting in a literature survey that "it is widely believed
that patent scope has been increased in the U.S. in the last two decades as a result of more lib-
eral application of the Doctrine of Equivalents").
72. The juxtaposition of expansive decisions relating to patentability with restrictive deci-
sions relating to scope is summarized in the practitioner's aphorism that "the Federal Circuit
will not rest until it has held every patent valid but not infringed."
73. This particular trend has been striking in the biotechnology field. See, e.g., Genentech,
Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997); University of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
74. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that claim
construction is a question of law to be decided by trial judges, subject to plenary review on ap-
peal. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996), aff'g 52 F.3d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1996). This takes the issue of claim construction away from juries and may make
expansive interpretations of claim language less likely.
75. Notably, the United States Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have both held that
a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is only permissible when the defen-
dant's product has an equivalent for every element in the patent claim. See Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d
1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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are predictability and certainty in the patent system?76 Has the ap-
proach of the Federal Circuit, particularly the use of pre-trial
Markman hearings to adjudicate claim construction, in fact in-
creased predictability of outcomes in patent litigation? This ques-
tion might be amenable to empirical investigation as well as to
theoretical analysis of the strategic implications of different ap-
proaches.
VII. LICENSING PRACTICES
Economists have made tremendous theoretical and empirical
contributions to understanding the different ways that patent own-
ers use their rights to capture the value of innovations. 77 This work
has highlighted the importance of licensing transactions in ensur-
ing that new inventions are efficiently utilized. Further work might
help resolve uncertainty in the legal literature over whether and
when licensing transactions can be relied upon to make new tech-
nologies available in the face of a growing thicket of patent rights.78
What are the limits of licensing? What safeguards are appropriate
when licensing transactions are persistently costly to the point of
consuming the gains from exchange? Is compulsory licensing ap-
propriate, or is it likely to do more harm than good? What are the
risks and benefits of providing safe harbors from antitrust liability
for patent pooling arrangements?79
CONCLUSION
We seem to be at the beginnings of a broader public debate
about the patent system than we have seen in many years. Com-
mentary on the patent system is extending beyond the scholarly
76. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have advanced the counterintuitive thesis that unpre-
dictability might improve the efficiency of the patent system. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer,
Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits
of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1000-05 (1999).
77. See e.g., Levin et al., supra note 14; Mansfield, supra note 14 at 180; COHEN ET AL., su-
pra note 2.
78. Compare Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (documenting the evolution of
institutions to reduce the costs of intellectual property licensing transactions in a variety of set-
tings), with Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is
This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming
2000) (documenting difficulties overcoming high transaction costs in the market for the exchange
of proprietary research tools among biomedical research institutions).
79. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Michelle Burtis, Intellectual Property & Antitrust Limita-
tions on Contract (George Mason Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 00-06, 2000).
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community and the bar into the popular media, suggesting growing
public interest and concern. This presents an important opportunity
for both legal scholars and economists to enlighten public debates.
We can play a more constructive role if we help each other to ask
the right questions and to figure out how best to address those
questions.
